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in 1989, and Iran on many occasions). At times, they have made tactical concessions, such as increasing wages; this, however, affects only wage-earners at the expense of the self-employed poor and the unemployed.14 Where the protests are local or smallscale, the governments usually have managed to end them by force. Workers in Kafr al-Dawwar in Egypt managed to fulfill only part of their demands. The Egyptian farmers' protests in 1998 across isolated villages failed to modify the new policy that ended tenant farmers' long-term control over land. However, when social protests have gained national support by embracing diverse issues and actors (such as students and the middle classes making economic as well as political claims), they often provoke significant changes, including political reform (as in Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey in the late 1980s).
Despite their drama and, at times, their remarkable impact, urban mass protests are usually spontaneous, ad hoc, and consequently uncommon; they often involve violence and a risk of repression. Urban riots are a response to the absence of effective institutionalized mechanisms of conflict resolution. The social groups without institutionally based power to disrupt (such as the unemployed, who cannot strike) and those who enjoy such power but find it inadequate (workers, students) are likely to follow leaders in initiating mass protests. This is not to say, as some have claimed, that Middle Eastern masses essentially lack a "truly collective life," resorting instead to "mob action.""15 For in favorable conditions, they also engage in modern forms of collective action-notably, trade unionism.
TRADE UNIONISM
Trade unionism represents an older and sustained institution through which working people have defended their rights or exerted pressure on economic elites and governments to bring about social change. Trade unions have the potential to respond rapidly and systematically to unjust labor practices, distributive issues, and political matters. At the same time, they are most affected by the current neo-liberal economic policies, which often result in new labor discipline and redundancies. Originally, trade unions in the Middle East emerged in the context of European colonial domination. Their struggles, therefore, involved both class and nationalist dimensions-usually a tense strategic position. At independence, most trade-union organizations were integrated into the state structure or the ruling parties, resulting in the current situation, in which unitary, compulsory unions make up the majority of labor organizations. This type of union, in which public-sector workers constitute the core members, operates in countries with populist pasts (such as Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria) as well as in Kuwait and Yemen. The Arab Gulf states, using mostly foreign workers, impose tough discipline and disallow labor organizations in exchange for relatively high pay. Surveillance, however, has not prevented occasional outbreaks of labor unrest, such as the Palestinian workers' strike in the Saudi oil industry in 1980s and the riots of Egyptian workers in Kuwait against discrimination in October 1999.16 Only Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Turkey have pluralist unions that are relatively independent from the state or ruling parties.
Union structure affects workers' ability to maintain their gains or advance them. Independent unions, more than corporatist ones, are likely to defend workers' rights.
However, in the experience of the region, workers tend to use the existing, corporatist organizations to further their own interests, as is shown in the state-controlled Workers Syndicates before the Iranian Revolution and Workers' Shuras and the Union of Unemployed Workers after. '7 This applies also to the corporatist trade unions in Egypt established by Nasser following the liberal era (1928-52), when labor unions enjoyed a period of relative independence."
Currently, organized public-sector workers, more than any other group, feel the immediate consequences of economic adjustment. Thus, trade unions are concerned with and often struggle against cuts in consumer subsidies, price rises, reductions in wages and allowances, layoffs, and government interference in union affairs. A human-rights organization reported seventy strikes against large companies in Egypt during 1998, most of which involved state security forces. The main cause of the industrial actions was "government reform policy."l'9 The Egyptian press, citing official statements, reported in early 1999 the occurrence of more than five strikes and sit-ins per week. These actions resulted largely from reductions in allowances and perquisites and the introduction of fines.20 In Iran, the 1990s saw a rapid increase in worker strikes. During the first half of 1991, some 2,000 strikes were reported.21 According to one account, strikes by workers trying to catch up with inflation were so common that the authorities hardly noticed them.22 New labor laws, redrafted to accord with the neo-liberal era and economic realities, have been hotly contested, because they often strip workers of several traditional rights-notably, job security. In Egypt, the labor unions compelled government and business to accept in 1994 an exchange of "the right to strike for the right to fire."23 In Iran, labor law remained a matter of dispute between the ruling clergy and pro-labor forces for more than a decade.
Some observers tend to underestimate the capacity of organized labor in the Middle East to affect social and political developments on the grounds that strikes, the workers' major weapon, are illegal and often involve the risk of arrest and imprisonment. In addition, they argue, states usually co-opt the leaderships of these largely corporatist labor unions, thus rendering union activism practically ineffective.24 It is true that strikes are illegal, and labor leaders may be bought off, with many of them becoming part of the ruling parties and the state bureaucracy. However, Posusney rightly argues that "labor has been able to pursue economic demands and wring concessions from the state, in spite of corporatist controls," and its ability to do so "is contingent on the specific issue at hand and how policy around that issue is made."25 The fact is that even the corporatist leadership must be somehow responsive to the views and concerns of its rank and file. Not only do labor leaders often express opposition to certain government policies (e.g., removal of subsidies, privatization, aspects of labor law), but the rank and file tend to wage unofficial industrial action when the leadership fails to take the initiative. In Egypt, for instance, opposition by organized labor has been the main cause of delays in the implementation or renegotiation of terms of adjustment with the IMF both currently and under previous government.26 Notwithstanding its social and political impact, organized labor in the Middle East has continued to comprise only a small portion of the total workforce. The vast majority have been self-employed, with a large fraction of wage-earners working in small workshops in which paternalistic labor relations prevail. Although tension between bosses and employees is not uncommon in these establishments, laborers are more likely to remain loyal to their bosses than to ally with their colleagues in the shop next door. On the whole, between one-third and one-half of the workforce in the cities (Egypt, 43%; Iran, 35%; Turkey, 36%; Yemen Arab Republic, 70%) are active in the informal sector, and thus remain unorganized and beyond the provisions of labor law. 27 The economic restructuring of the 1980s has further undermined organized labor, as the public sector, the core of trade unionism, is shrinking because of closures, downsizing, and early retirements. Numerous reports point to the declining capacity of the region's labor movements to mobilize. Organized labor in Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia, and Iran is described as "disjointed," "defensive," "decapitated and de-proletarianized.''28 Labor is becoming more informal and fragmented, with less or no protection, and dispersed across vast arrays of activities and spaces among the unemployed, casual workers, and domestic labor, in the small workshops, and on street corners.29
COMMUNITY ACTIVISM
For the urban grass-roots, then, urban community or neighborhood may offer a sense of common identity and a ground for collective action in the stead of the workplace. For in the neighborhoods, most face the same difficulties in ensuring secure housing, paying rent, and acquiring access to urban amenities, schools, clinics, cultural centers, and the like. Community-based collective struggles for such "collective consumption" through institutional settings is what in a sense characterizes the urban social movements. This kind of community activism, often contentious, should be distinguished from the notion of "community development." The latter has had a double effect of both maintaining the status quo and engendering social change. Indeed, the program of community development in the West was originally aimed at counter-insurgency against communism (in the colonies), containment of discontent among the black underclass (in the United States), and management of the poor by providing community solutions (in the United Kingdom).39 Yet community development may also open space to cultivate resistance against the elites and foster social change. This is often the case when the grass-roots initiate development on their own or are mobilized by local leaders, NGOs, religious groups, or politicians (as in Brazilian barrios or SelfEmployed Women's Association in India). Here mobilization may not necessarily be contentious; it could express cooperative community engagement whereby people work together to improve their lives and communities with a degree of control over decisions and their outcome. How do the Middle Eastern cities fare in terms of such community activism?
In recent years, a number of community mobilizations took place in Middle Eastern cities that bore some resemblance to urban social movements. Take, for instance, the campaign of the people of Ezbat Mekawy, a low-income community in Cairo, against industrial pollution in the area where smelters had caused major health and environmental problems.31 They used traditional strategies of communication within the community, as well as modern tactics such as engaging the media, lobbying politicians, and resorting to the court system as a means of registering opposition. In a different example, members of the Shubra al-Khaima community in Egypt rapidly responded to a governorate's plan in August 1994 to demolish an unauthorized section of a community complex (a mosque, a clinic, and a pharmacy) that had taken inhabitants ten years to build with their own money. 32 At certain periods-notably, when states become more vulnerable-even more enduring and large-scale mobilization develops. The collapse of the state during the Lebanese civil war caused community mobilization in the Muslim south, where its institutions continue to this day. Thousands from the south moved to the southern suburb (dahiya) of Beirut, building illegal settlements that currently make up 40 percent of the homes in the area. Following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, networks of volunteer and associational groups played a vital role not only in supporting civil disobedience, but also in filling the vacuum created by loss of municipal services.33 The Palestinian Popular Organizations acted as the main organs of social provisioning and development in the Occupied Territories both during the Intifada and after.34 Immediately after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, many poor families took over hundreds of vacant homes and half-finished apartment blocks, refurbishing them as their own properties and establishing apartment councils to manage them collectively. In the meantime, land takeovers and illegal construction accelerated. With the help of local and outside mobilizers, squatters got together and demanded electricity and running water; when they were refused or encountered delays, they acquired them illegally. They established roads, opened clinics and stores, constructed mosques and libraries, and organized refuse collection. They further set up associations and community networks and participated in local consumer cooperatives. A new and a more autonomous way of living, functioning, and organizing community was in the making.
However, when compared with some Latin American countries, these experiences seem acutely uncommon. They tend to happen in extraordinary social and political circumstances--in revolutionary conditions or in times of crisis and war, when the state is undermined or totally absent, as in Palestine. Thus, few such activities become a pattern for sustained social mobilization and institutionalization in normal situations. Once the exceptional conditions come to an end, the experiments begin to wither away or get distorted. In Iran, community activism did not get a chance to consolidate itself. Lack of experience, rivalry of outside mobilizers and political groups, and especially the hostility of the government seriously undermined the experiment. Instead, Mosque Associations were established not only to offer the locals assistance in distributing basic necessities such as food during the war with Iraq; they served also to control political discontent in the neighborhoods. They resembled the 3,000 Community Development Associations (CDAs) that currently operate throughout Egypt.35 Although CDAs contribute to the poor's social well-being, their mobilizing impact is minimal. As a field researcher working in a popular quarter of Cairo stated: "Even in the highly politicized Sayyeda Zeinab, organized social action that involves the area's inhabitants seems minimal. The residents' role is usually limited to that of beneficiaries of whatever services . .. are available."36 Needless to say, urban communities are not blank spots devoid of social interaction. Surely, they are more than small villages subject to individualism, anonymity, and competition. Nevertheless, they contain numerous forms of networks and institutions. In the modern city of Tehran, neighborly relations, according to a recent study, still prevail; members participate in assisting one another, pay visits, consult, and take part in weddings and funerals.37 In Egyptian cities, Migrant Associations have institutionalized some of these functions; funeral activities and maintaining cemeteries for the people from "home villages" are their main activity.38 Influential individuals may take advantage of the state-controlled neighborhood councils (majalis al-mahalliyyah, shara-yi mahallat). But the informal credit systems (such as the jama'iyat in Egypt and sanduq-i qarz al-hasanih in Iran) serve as perhaps the most important form of community network in urban centers.
Social networks that extend beyond kinship and ethnicity remain largely casual, unstructured, and paternalistic. The weakness of civic or non-kinship cooperation at the community level only reinforces traditional hierarchical and paternalistic relations with people depending on local leaders (kibar, shaykhs, Friday prayer leaders), problem-solvers, and even local bullies (lats or baltajiyya) rather than on broad-based social activism. In such social conditions, the modern institutions such as politicalparty branches, local NGOs, or police are susceptible to clientism. Thus, while the Egyptian lower classes, for instance, are aware of environmental problems, they undertake little in the way of collective action, either through communal engagement to upgrade the community itself or through protest actions to demand that officials do this for them.39
Why is community activism, a social action for collective consumption, relatively uncommon in the Middle East? Why is the region a "blank space" in the global map of community action, as some observers have put it?40 One reason has to do with the legacy of populism, which continues to influence the political behavior of the ordinary people in most Middle Eastern countries. Populist regimes established a social contract between the lower and middle classes and the state, whereby the state agreed to provide the basic necessities in exchange for their support, social peace, and consequently demobilization, or just a controlled mobilization. This was not an agreement between the state and independent classes. Rather, it was an agreement between the state and a shapeless mass, an aggregate of individuals and corporate institutions in which independent collective identity and action were seriously undermined. Although distributive populism is currently waning and market forces are escalating, many people still tend to look at the states as the main source of protection as well as misfortune. In countries where authoritarian populism still predominates (such as Iran in the 1980s, Libya, and Syria), the statesmen's dread of the public sphere has given a structure to the regimes that in some ways incarcerate the entire population.
This legacy has also contributed to the tendency among many ordinary people to seek individualistic solutions to their problems.41 More often than not, families of different social strata tend to compete when resources are scarce. This occurs even more often in the new and heterogeneous communities (such as Dar Essalaam, Madinat al-Nahda, and Kafr Seif in Cairo, and Islamshahr and Khak-i Safid in Tehran) than in the old city quarters, where the relative homogeneity of inhabitants and the longevity of residence have produced a spatial identity. The coexistence of identifiable strata in a community-such as old-timers and newcomers, those with and without security of tenure, and different ethnic groups-often sharpens the existing competition, leading to conflicts.42 Consequently, with solidarity intangible among the people, recourse to the mighty state-this provider and punisher-becomes an alternative way to achieve their goals. Many of them know, however, that the bureaucracy is unable or unwilling to respond formally to the growing demands of the urban poor, and they tend to seek informal, individualistic, and even opportunistic ways to cultivate wasta or parti (connection) or bribe the officials. "The best way to get whatever you want done," said a resident of the Sayyida Zeinab district of Cairo, "is to pay a bribe to any of the assistants of any of the area's big politicians and they will do for you whatever you want."43 A key contributor to such social response is the lack of a structure of opportunity for mobilization. The advent of neo-liberal economies in the Middle East has not accompanied a sufficiently democratic polity.44 Put simply, most governments in the region are still apprehensive of and tend to restrict independent collective mobilization for fear of losing political space. In many states, public demonstrations and gatherings are largely illegal. As a street vendor in Cairo's Madinat al-Nahda invoking Egypt's Emergency Law said: "If I call my neighboring street vendor to get together and do something collectively, this would be called mobilization, and I could be taken in for that."45 A human-rights agency's account of farmers' protests in twenty-five villages against the new land law in Egypt in the course of eight months reported fifteen deaths, 218 injuries, and 822 arrests. 46 Alternatively, the governments may allow popular initiative in order to control it. Where it succeeds in doing so, the popular classes tend to lose interest, with the result that their activism fails to sustain itself. Because the supporting environment is lacking, they fail to experiment and learn new ways of doing things. Thus, most of the genuine popular institutions transform into the extension of the states.
Political democracy is instrumental in another way. In a truly competitive polity, political forces are compelled to bargain with and thus mobilize the grass-roots to win their electoral support. This is how the urban poor in Iran became the subject of an intense competition between the ruling clergy and various oppositional groups in the early 1980s. Similarly, a sustained competitive system in Turkey allowed the Islamist Rifah Party (RP) to mobilize the urban masses in the twenty-six municipalities it controlled, thereby giving the electorate strong bargaining power. Manipulative electoral practices in Egypt, however, tend to limit the oppositional parties to restricted local campaigns, as in Ezbet Mikawy described earlier.
Finally, collective patronage may also lead unintentionally to social and political mobilization when patrons bargain with their poor clients' leaders in their quest for personal and political power. Mobilization of street vendors in Mexico City through negotiation between the vendors' union leaders and politicians is partly the result of this type of political patronage.47 In much of the Middle East (except in Lebanon and in the case of Istanbul's street car-parkers' "mafia"), however, patronage seems to work more through individual channels and rarely leads to group activities. Favors are granted to individuals or families (in getting the security of tenure or jobs, for instance) than groups who then can bargain with their patron in exchange for his support.
In brief, community activism in the form of urban social movements seems to be largely a Latin American model rooted in socio-political conditions of that region (although it can be found in South Africa and, to a lesser extent, in India). The likes of local soup kitchens, neighborhood associations, church groups, and street trade What makes all of these activities "Islamic" is the combination of an alternative to both the state and the private sector, the religious conviction of many of their activists, Islamic-based funding, and, finally, the provision of affordable social services. It is widely agreed that such Islamic community activities often outdo their secular counterparts. The availability of funding in the form of zakat (2.5% of income) from Muslim businesses and activists, sadaqdt (various donations), khums (a fifth) levied on the savings of Shi'i Muslims, and external aid (e.g., from Iran to Hezbollah and from Saudi Arabia to the FIS) render these associations comparatively advantageous. In the early 1990s, the Nasser Bank, which supervises the Zakat Committees in Egypt, reported a $10 million zakat fund."5 The additional advantages include the spirit of voluntarism, as well as legal favor. That is, unlike secular NGOs, which have to surmount many bureaucratic hurdles to raise funds, the religious PVOs tend to get around the law by obtaining donations and other contributions from Muslim believers in places of worship."
The grass-roots activities of the Islamists, in the meantime, compelled other social forces to enter into the competition hoping to share this political space. The Turkish tariqas (religious orders) emulated one another in community activities through mosques and their attendant associations." Al-Azhar, the pillar of establishment Islam in Egypt, began to offer similar social services to the needy in competition with the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya. Similarly, secular groups-notably, secular NGOs-seem to work hard to offer their own piecemeal alternatives. An esti- dren; and a sizable portion of agricultural, housing, small business credit, and welfare services.74 In addition, given the growing privatization and high costs of health care and education, the poorest segments of society would hardly be able to afford their increasing costs without these associations. In a sense, NGOs assist the declining public sector on which millions of citizens still rely. In my research in Cairo, for example, NGOs' premises often served a community function and could be used free of charge or for a nominal fee as day-care centers; medical clinics; family-planning services; recreational and vocational training classes in sewing, dollmaking, electricalappliance repair; and the like. One association that provides micro-credit loans to single mothers has made it possible for hundreds women to set up vending enterprises in their localities and thereby become functionally self-sufficient. NGOs' headquarters often served a social function, as well, allowing local poor families, mostly women, to gather in public and learn social skills, such as how to talk in public or behave "properly." An estimated 5 million poor people benefit from such associations.75 The 3,000 Egyptian CDAs alone serve some 300,000 people by implementing programs in health care, food production, women's projects, family planning, income generation, and child and youth development.76 Social development, however, is more than mere survival, relief, and safety net, with total dependence on charity or precarious foreign aid.77 In addition, in the current development discourse, social development does not only mean fulfilling basic needs; it also involves achieving social and economic rights and being self-sustaining. This requires, in Anisur Rahman's words, "creating a condition where people can think, use their abilities, and act, that is, to participate."78 Ideally, an "NGO should work so as to make itself progressively redundant to any group or set of groups with which it has been working intensively." In short, they should mobilize the grass-roots. How well do the Middle Eastern development NGOs meet this goal of mobilization?
Many NGO advocates have complained about the absence of a spirit of participation in the NGOs. Despite a recent tendency to establish professional and advocacy associations, Jordanian NGOs remain largely "charity-driven."79 Activists hope that they will adopt an "enabling approach."80 Lebanese NGOs still carry the legacy of war and are active mainly in the fields of relief and emergency; like their Palestinian counterparts, they depend heavily on external humanitarian assistance.81 Only recently has there been a clear shift from relief and humanitarian assistance to the developmental and advocacy associations (human rights, women, and democracy).82 The Charitable Societies in Palestine have managed to alleviate (in the areas of relief, health, education, and culture) the pressure generated by daily needs. They play a "preventive role at best, by maintaining basic social care, but they do not perform a developmental role in the full sense of the term."83 Accordingly, NGOs' overwhelming focus on services at the cost of ignoring productive activities has pushed the Palestinians toward further dependence on the Israeli economy.
Several accounts of NGOs-notably, the likes of the traditional welfare associations in Egypt-point to their largely paternalistic attitudes and structure.84 Paternalism is reflected both in local NGOs' top-down internal organization and in their relationship with the beneficiaries. The main decisions in NGOs are made by one or two people, with rare participation of staff, including the extension workers. In turn, staff are motivated not by altruistic incentives but by monetary motives. With the dearth of voluntarism, NGO work for status-conscious but low-paid employees appears to be no more than a dull job experience.
Paternalistic NGOs perceive their beneficiaries more as recipients of assistance than as participants in development. For their "favors" and benevolence, NGOs often expect loyalty, support, and service. It is not the place of beneficiaries to question the adequacy and quality of services or the accountability of the NGOs, for this would be interpreted as interfering in NGOs' affairs. It is not the target groups but the NGO leaders and donors who define the needs and priorities of a given NGO. A common problem among Middle Eastern NGOs is project duplication, which results not only from inadequate coordination, but also from ignoring the specific concerns of the beneficiaries. Competition and factionalism among NGOs, and the variations in donors' (often intermediary NGOs) policies prevent coordination of development strategies and add up to the problem of duplication. Indeed, local associations are often subjected to clientelistic relations with the intermediary NGOs, who extend funds to the former.
The professional NGOs, which have grown exponentially in the 1990s, seem to have overcome some of the administrative and attitudinal shortcomings of the more traditional welfare associations. They attempt to practice participatory methods both internally and in relation to their clients, placing the emphasis on professionalism, education, and efficiency. A number of women's, human-rights, and advocacy NGOs reflect this trend today.85 However, certain features of professional organizationshierarchy of authority, fixed procedures, rigidity, and the division of labor-tend to diminish the spirit of participation. Rima Hammami has shown in the case of Palestine that local activism and mass organizations before the peace process were mostly mobilizational-that is, the activities were initiated, decided on, and carried out with the involvement of the grass-roots. After the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was set up, however, the conditions of foreign funding turned these groups into organizations of the professional elite, with particular discourses of efficiency and expertise. This new arrangement tends to create distance between NGOs and the grass-roots. 86 Thus, what NGO activism means in reality is the activism of NGO leaders, not that of the millions of targeted people. These NGOs serve more their employees than the political beneficiaries.
In addition to the internal problems (paternalism and administrative inadequacy), government surveillance poses a real obstacle to autonomous and healthy operation of NGOs. In general, as with the grass-roots associations, states in the region express a contradictory position toward NGOs: they lend them support as long as the NGOs reduce the burden of social-service provision and poverty alleviation. In the late 1990s, recognition was growing among Middle Eastern states of the contributions made by the voluntary sector in social development, as reflected in new and more favorable NGO laws and the public expression of support for the organizations (as in Egypt, Iran, and Jordan). Yet the governments also fear losing political space, because there is the possibility of NGOs turning oppositional. Professional associations (in Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Iran) are often drawn into politics, compensating for the absence or inadequacy of political parties. Consequently, governments, while allowing associational life, impose strict legal control by screening initiators; they also check fund-raising, and unilat-erally outlaw nonconformist NGOs. This contradictory position is partly a function of the states' economic and political capacities-while economic weakness in a country may unintentionally generate space for people's self-activity, the states' political feebleness usually restrains it. To illustrate, the Iranian government, lacking financial resources to curb population growth in the early 1990s, mobilized more than 20,000 female volunteers who managed educational work to achieve successful family-planning and primary health-care programs in cities, bringing the growth rate down from a high 3.4 percent in 1987 to 1.4 percent by 1996. Yet the government fiercely rejected these women's demand to set up an association because it feared independent organization.87 In a way, this implies that in practice the state favors certain NGOs (depending on what they do) and is leery of others. For instance, associations that belong to well-connected high officials are treated better than are critical human-rights and women's rights organizations.88 It is, therefore, crucial not to approach the NGO sector as an homogenous entity. Just as with the concept of "civil society," class and connection intervene to stratify the private voluntary sector.
These handicaps are partially cultural and attitudinal (e.g., the paternalistic approach to development and status orientation) and partly structural. Unlike those of trade unions and cooperatives, the beneficiaries of NGOs are not its members and therefore cannot hold it accountable for inadequacy. The same relationship, in turn, persists between local NGOs and donor agencies; as a result, the NGOs are accountable not to their beneficiaries but to their donors.89 Mahmoud Mamdani is perhaps correct in saying that the NGOs do undermine the existing clientelism, yet they simultaneously create a new type.90 The question, then, is whether the present NGOs are structurally able to foster grass-roots participation for meaningful development. Perhaps we simply expect too much from NGOs, as Niel Webster, writing on India, has noted. Maybe we attribute "these NGOs with development qualities and abilities that they do not in fact possess."91 Whatever our expectations, the fact remains that selfactivity-collective or individual mobilization-remain a crucial factor in poor peoples' elevation to a point at which they can meaningfully manage their own lives. In the Middle East, the existing forms of activism in the communities-or through labor unions, social Islam, and the NGOs-do contribute to the well-being of the underprivileged groups. However, they fall short of activating and directing a great number of people in sustained mobilization for social development. The socio-political characteristics of the Middle East instead tend to generate a particular form of activism-a grass-roots non-movement that, I think, has far-reaching implications for social change. I have called this the "quiet encroachment of the ordinary."
THE QUIET ENCROACHMENT
The notion of "quiet encroachment" describes the silent, protracted, and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and powerful in a quest for survival and improvement of their lives.92 They are characterized by quiet, largely atomized, and prolonged mobilization with episodic collective action-open and fleeting struggles without clear leadership, ideology, or structured organization. Although the quiet encroachment is basically a non-movement, it is distinct from survival strategies or "everyday resistance" in that, first, the struggles and gains of the grass-roots are at the cost not of fellow poor people or themselves but of the state, the rich, and the general public. In order to light their shelters, the urban poor tap electricity not from their neighbors, but from the municipal power poles; to raise their living standard, they do not prevent their children from attending school so that they can work but, rather, reduce the time they spend at their formal jobs to have more time for their secondary work in the informal sector.
In addition, these struggles should be seen not as necessarily defensive merely in the realm of resistance but as cumulatively encroaching, meaning that the actors tend to expand their space by winning new positions to move on. This kind of quiet activism challenges many fundamental state prerogatives, including the meaning of "order," control of public space, and the meaning of "urban." But the most immediate consequence is the redistribution of social goods in the form of the (unlawful and direct) acquisition of collective consumption (land, shelter, piped water, electricity), public space (street pavement, intersections, street parking places), and opportunities (favorable business conditions, locations, and labels).
Post-Revolution Iran experienced an unprecedented colonization, mostly by the poor, of public and private land, apartments, hotels, street sidewalks, and public utili- This informal and often uncharged use of collective services leaves governments little choice but selectively to integrate the informal settlements, hoping to commit the residents to pay for services they have thus far used illegally. Securing property and community tax is another consideration. Although the poor welcome the extension of provisions, they often cannot afford to pay the bills. Therefore, it is not uncommon to see reinformalization springing up from the fringes of the new formalized communities (as in Tehran's Islamshahr and Cairo's Izbat al-Hajjana).
In the domain of work, "street subsistence workers" quietly take over public thoroughfares to conduct their business on the vast parallel economy. The streets in the commercial districts of Middle Eastern cities are colonized by street vendors who encroach on favorable business opportunities that shopkeepers have created. Cairo reportedly has 600,000 street vendors, and Tehran, until recently, had some 150,000. Informality means not only that the actors generally escape the costs of formality (tax regulation, for instance) but that they also benefit from the theft of imported goods, brands, and intellectual property. With capital of $6, a Cairene vendor can make up to $55 a month. 94 Thousands of poor (in Cairo, Istanbul, and Tehran, for instance) subsist on tips from parking cars in the streets that they control and organize in such a way as to create maximum parking space. They have turned many streets into virtual parking lots, which they privately control by creating working gangs with elaborate internal organization. Establishing alternative transportation systems is another way to make a living. Izbat Khairullah in Cairo typifies thousands of similar neighborhoods in the region, where vans carry passengers without even registration plates. A newspaper described this community as one in which "no official has ever entered since its establishment" in the early 1980s.95 The logic behind these types of encroachment is reflected in the words of a Cairene street vendor, who said, "When dealing with the government, you have to take the proverb, 'What you can win with, play with." '96 Governments usually send mixed signals about quiet encroachment. On the one hand, they see the people helping themselves by building their own shelters, getting their own services, creating their own jobs. On the other hand, they realize that these activities are carried out largely at the cost of the state, the propertied, and the public. Equally important, the poor tend to out-administer the authorities by establishing a different public order, acting independently and often tarnishing the image of modernity the nation seeks to portray. "We are not against the vendors making a living," says the chief of Cairo's security department, "but not at the expense of Egypt's reputation. They spoil the picture of Cairo, they block the streets, they crowd the pavements."97 Yet encroachment is tolerated in practice as long as it appears limited. But once it goes too far, governments often react. Post-Revolutionary Iran, for instance, saw many bloody confrontations between the security forces and encroachers. Daily police harassment is a common practice in many Middle Eastern cities. Nevertheless, the frequent offensives against squatters and street vendors often fail to bring a result. The actors either resort to on-the-spot resistance (as in Iran) or, more commonly, resume their activities quietly following each tactical retreat (as in Egypt). For instance, while the municipal police drive around to remove street vendors-in which case the vendors suddenly disappear-the vendors normally return to their work once the police are gone. "Everything we are doing is useless," says an Egyptian official.98 The Iranian authorities became even more frustrated when "anti-vending squads" failed to clear public spaces. Confronting quiet encroachment is particularly difficult for vulnerable governments. The municipalities, using stick-and-carrot tactics, may indeed manage to demolish communities, drive vendors away from the main streets, or track down unregistered transportation. Nevertheless, they have to yield to the actors' demands by offering alternative solutions. Where removals or demolitions have actually been carried out, the dispossessed have been offered alternative street markets, housing, or regulated taxi service. Only 13 of a total 81 squatter settlements in Cairo (excluding Guiza) have been identified for demolition (for safety reasons); the rest are planned to be upgraded.99
Quiet encroachment, therefore, is not a politics of collective demand-making, a politics of protest. Rather, it is a mix of individual and collective direct action. It is accentuated under the socio-political circumstance characterized by authoritarian states, populist ideology, and strong family ties. The authoritarian bureaucratic states make collective demand-making both risky (because of repression) and less than effective (owing to bureaucratic inefficiency); populism tends to obstruct the public sphere and autonomous collectivities, rendering primary loyalties the more functional mechanism of survival and struggle. Yet, in the long run, the encroachment strategy generates a reality on the ground with which states often find no option but to come to terms. In the end, the poor manage to bring about significant changes in their own lives, the urban structure, and social policy. It is precisely this centrality of the agency, of the urban grass-roots, that distinguishes quiet encroachment from any incremental social change that may result from urbanization in general.
Although this kind of activism represents a life-long, sustained, and self-generating advance, it is largely unlawful and constantly involves risk of harassment, insecurity, and repression. As fluid and unstructured forms of activism, encroachment has the advantage of flexibility and versatility, but it falls short of developing legal, financial, organizational, and even moral support. The challenge is to encourage convergence of the mobilizational element of quiet encroachment, the institutional capacity of NGOs, and the consent of the authorities. The Street Food Vendors' Organization (SFVO) in the Egyptian city of Minia displays such a possibility. A number of NGO activists helped 700 vendors organize and gain the support of the local authorities. Once it was set up, the SFVO launched a credit fund, improved hygiene, introduced bulk purchase of foodstuffs, provided group health insurance, helped to ease registration in the state bureaucracy, and eliminated police harassment. This successful experiment has encouraged other cities to take similar initiatives.""' Yet the poor's encroachment on the propertied and powerful, the public, and the state is surely not unlimited. The grass-roots might be able to secure many necessary provisions, jobs, and urban services-and these are certainly crucial. But how can they attain schools, public parks, health insurance, and security at home and work, which are linked to the larger structures and processes? One should perhaps begin by recognizing both the potential and the limitations of grass-roots activism, as well as state involvement in redistribution matters at a large scale.
CONCLUSIONS
Early reaction by the urban grass-roots to aspects of ERSA policies during the 1980s included developing coping strategies and mounting urban riots. These strategies, however, seem to have given way to more institutionalized methods of dealing with austerity. The safety nets provided by social Islam and NGOs (coupled with state repression) contributed to this shift in method. With political Islam undermined (institutionalized, co-opted, or curbed) by the end of the 1990s, social Islam, "NGOization," and quiet encroachment, despite their flaws, appear to have become the dominant forms of activism that now contribute to improving some aspects of people's lives in Middle Eastern countries. Although quiet encroachment has a longer history, the spread of Islamism and NGOs gained new momentum in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, the period in which neo-liberal economic policies began to be implemented. The growth of these types of activism (along with the new social movements associated with women and human rights) coincides with the relative decline in traditional class-based movements-peasant organizations, cooperative movements, and trade unionism. The transformation of the rural social structure, "de-peasantization," and growing urbanization are eroding the social bases of peasant and cooperative movements. The weakening of economic populism, closely linked to the new economic restructuring, has resulted in a decline of public-sector employment, which constituted the core of the corporatist trade unionism; at the same time, it has led to a growing fragmentation of the workforce, expressed in the expansion of the informal urban economy. State bureaucracy (as a segment of the public sector) continues to remain weighty; however, its employees, unlike workers in industry or services, largely have been unorganized. A large segment of low-paid state employees survive on incomes deriving from second or third jobs in the informal sector.
In the meantime, the increasing informality of economies and expanded urbanization in the Middle East tend to cause a shift in popular needs and demands. The growth of informality means that struggles for wages and conditions, the typical focus of traditional trade unionism, are losing ground in favor of broader concerns for jobs, informal work conditions, and affordable cost of living. Rapid urbanization, however, increases the demand for urban collective consumption--shelter, decent housing, electricity, piped water, transportation, health care, and education. This desire for citizenship, expressed in community membership and developmental rights, is one that traditional trade unionism is unable to address. The task instead falls on community movements that remain feeble in the Middle East. However, the scope of social Islam and NGOs, despite their contributions to social welfare, is also unable to realize fully the goal of social development. By the close of the 1990s, some Middle Eastern governments were cautiously recognizing the activities of some civil-society organizations, especially the social-development NGOs. New NGO laws in Egypt and Palestine, public expression of more positive attitudes in Jordan, and the support given by reformist President Khatami to popular participation in Iran demonstrate some change of attitude. Yet these measures fall short of empowering civil-society organizations from above and encouraging social development from below. It is, therefore, mainly to the strategy of quiet encroachment that the urban grass-roots in the Middle East resort in order to fulfill their growing needs.
Thus emerges a salient feature of grass-roots activism in the region: it is characterized less by demand-making movements than by direct actions, be they individual, informal, or institutional. Hence, largely because of the inefficient and authoritarian nature of states, people are less inclined to get together to demand housing, than to acquire that housing directly. Similarly, Mosque Associations, instead of mobilizing people to demand welfare from the state, attempt to supply the services directly. Otherwise, people exert collective pressure when their already acquired gains are threatened. In this process, the intervention of advocacy NGOs (such as those for human rights, women, or democracy) to publicize the cause of the grass-roots often contributes significantly to their struggles.
These claim-making acts, collective or individual, have both practical and policy implications. Through direct actions, the grass-roots and their middle-class supporters make themselves heard; they create realities on the ground with which the authorities sooner or later must come to terms.1o' Joan Nelson's contention that, because the poor are never organized well enough, they fail to exert influence on national policies is true.102 Yet the cumulative consequence of poor people's individual direct actions may, in the end, result in some improvements from below and policy changes from above. In short, pressure from below in the experience of the Middle East is highly relevant to social development. Given the gradual retreat of states from their responsibilities in offering social welfare, the poor in the Middle East would have been in a far worse condition had grass-roots actions been totally absent. Yet grass-roots activities do have limitations in terms of their own internal constraints, their capacity to win concessions adequately, and in relations to the constraints directed from the states. It is a mistake to leave the entire task of social development to initiatives from below; a bigger mistake is to give up on the states-in particular, on their crucial role in large-scale distribution. Yet imagining policy change and the concrete improvement of people's lives without their pressure or direct action seems no more than an unwarranted illusion. 
